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Academic Articles Awards > Economics

Enforcement of anticollusion laws against domestic and foreign firms

Pierre Cremieux and Edward A. Snyder, Concurrences Review N° 4-2017, Art. N° 84877, 2017

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Do antitrust authorities consider the national identities of firms when enforcing anticollusion laws? Authorities may follow a neutral enforcement approach or focus on either foreign or domestic firms. We investigate these issues in the context of cartel enforcement against EU, US, and rest-of-the-world (ROW) firms by the European Union and the United States—the two jurisdictions with the longest and most robust enforcement histories. Our results indicate that national identities matter. The European Union is more likely to fine domestic and ROW firms than US firms. The United States also disproportionately targets ROW firms, but is no more likely to fine EU firms than domestic firms. With respect to the size of fines, EU enforcement outcomes show no significant differences among categories of firms. The United States, however, levies significantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms, whether from the European Union or the rest of the world.

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